SECTOR REPORT | PART II OF THE FAYD ROBOTICS SERIES | DATA AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 2026


# From Ore to Autonomy

## Public-Market Exposure to the Humanoid and Physical AI Stack

*Part II | Company Exposure Framework and Scenario Assessment*

FAYD CAPITAL GROUP

**From Ore to Autonomy: where each company sits in the physical-AI stack**




*From Ore to Autonomy*

MP Materials, Moog and Symbotic provide exposure to different stages of the same thesis; the end state is not current revenue for any of them.

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Public-market exposure to humanoid robotics remains indirect. Most companies developing general-purpose humanoids are private, while listed beneficiaries typically derive only a limited share of current revenue from robotics. This report therefore separates the thesis into three layers that must scale for physical AI to become economically meaningful: critical materials, mechanical motion systems, and deployed automation. MP Materials, Moog, and Symbotic provide distinct exposure to those layers.

MP Materials sits furthest upstream. Its relevance comes through neodymium-praseodymium and neodymium-iron-boron permanent magnets, critical inputs for compact, high-torque electric motors. Between 2021 and 2025, rare-earth oxide production increased from 42,413 metric tons to 50,692 metric tons, while separated NdPr production moved from zero to 2,599 metric tons. The more important change is qualitative: MP progressed from a concentrate exporter toward a vertically integrated U.S. rare-earth and magnet platform, with $66.9 million of Magnetics revenue in 2025 and finished NdFeB magnet manufacturing beginning in December 2025, with commercial deliveries guided to ramp from late 2026.

Moog sits in the mechanical-control layer. Its filings do not show material humanoid revenue, but its technology base in precision motion control, electromechanical actuation, servo systems, and high-reliability controls maps directly onto the joint and motion requirements of advanced robotics. From 2021 to 2025, consolidated revenue increased from $2.85 billion to $3.86 billion, a 7.9% CAGR, while segment operating profit rose from roughly

$271 million to $450 million, a 13.5% CAGR. Industrial revenue grew much more slowly, but the segment's operating margin recovered from 8.0% in 2022 to 11.3% in 2025. Moog therefore offers robotics optionality inside an already profitable aerospace, defense, and industrial platform.

Symbotic is the closest of the three to current physical-AI commercialization. It already sells autonomous robots, robotic manipulation systems, machine vision, and AI-enabled orchestration software into large warehouses. Revenue increased from $251.9 million in 2021 to $2.25 billion in 2025, a roughly 73% CAGR, while systems in deployment rose from five to 50. Gross margin expanded from about 4% to 19%, and adjusted EBITDA improved from a loss of $17.6 million in 2023 to positive $147.5 million in 2025. Symbotic is not a humanoid company, but it provides a live case study for the economics and operational requirements of replacing structured human labor with autonomous robotic systems.

Taken together, the three companies create a layered exposure framework across the physical-AI stack. MP Materials captures the materials and magnet content of advanced motors; Moog captures precision actuation and control; Symbotic captures the commercialization of autonomous robotic labor in an existing operating environment. The structure reduces dependence on any single humanoid OEM or adoption path, while preserving distinct risks at each layer, including execution, cyclicality, customer concentration, and thematic dilution.

Section 7 adds a scenario-based assessment. At 30 September 2026 prices, the driver-based bear/base/bull framework, referenced to 31 December 2027 and weighted 25%/50%/25%, produces probability-weighted returns of roughly -16% for MP Materials, -2% for Moog, and -3% for Symbotic. Moog trades close to its modeled base case. The resulting assessment separates the thematic case from entry valuation: the stack can remain strategically attractive even when current prices already capitalize a large share of the favorable operating outcome. The scenario values are not price targets and are not derived from a full DCF or integrated three-statement model.

## 1 BUILDING EXPOSURE ACROSS THE PHYSICAL AI STACK

The physical-AI value chain can be framed around three economic questions. Can the supply chain deliver high-performance materials and components at acceptable cost? Can those inputs be converted into reliable, power-dense mechanical systems with the precision required for useful work? And can those systems be deployed into workflows where labor savings, throughput gains, and utilization justify the capital invested? MP Materials, Moog, and Symbotic map onto those questions in sequence.

This framing also separates technology exposure from revenue maturity. MP Materials has the clearest link to a scarce physical input, but its earnings remain heavily exposed to rare-earth prices and the economics of its downstream buildout. Moog has mature cash-generating businesses and relevant engineering capabilities, but humanoids remain optionality rather than a disclosed earnings driver. Symbotic has the strongest evidence of robotic commercialization, although its systems operate in highly structured warehouses and its economics remain concentrated in a small number of major customers.

The result is exposure across different stages of adoption. MP Materials and Moog provide enabling exposure before humanoid unit volumes are large enough to appear explicitly in reported revenue. Symbotic sits further along the commercialization curve, where the central questions are deployment scale, margin durability, uptime, support requirements, and customer concentration.





*Exhibit 1 | Three Companies, Three Layers of the Physical-AI Value Chain*

The names are presented as complementary layers of the stack, not as interchangeable humanoid pure plays.
*None of the three companies is shown as deriving material revenue from humanoid robots; the end state is the thesis, not current revenue.*
Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

### Three Layers of Exposure

| Company | Layer | Current proof point | 2025 scale marker | Primary thesis risk |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **MP Materials** | Materials / magnets | Separated NdPr and magnet manufacturing | 50,692 MT REO; 2,599 MT NdPr; $66.9mm Magnetics revenue | Commodity pricing, capex, downstream ramp |
| **Moog** | Actuation / motion control | Precision motion and Industrial Automation | $3.86bn revenue; 11.3% Industrial margin; ~$6.0bn backlog | Thematic dilution and cyclicality |
| **Symbotic** | Robotics systems / physical AI | Commercial autonomous warehouse robotics | $2.25bn revenue; 50 systems; ~19% gross margin | Customer concentration and deployment execution |

Source: Company filings as summarized in the accompanying Fayd Capital research notes.

## 2 MP MATERIALS: THE MATERIALS AND MAGNET LAYER

MP Materials provides the most upstream expression of the thesis. Humanoid robots require compact motors capable of producing high torque relative to size and weight. NdFeB permanent magnets are critical inputs in many high-performance motor architectures, and MP's five-year strategy has moved steadily toward capturing more of that value chain domestically. The sequence matters: Mountain Pass concentrate production represents the upstream resource, Stage II separation converts that material into higher-value NdPr products, and the Magnetics business converts rare-earth inputs into precursor materials and finished magnets.

The upstream asset has already demonstrated scale. REO production was 42,413 metric tons in 2021, 42,499 in 2022, 41,557 in 2023, 45,455 in 2024, and 50,692 in 2025. That is a 4.6% annualized increase from 2021 to 2025, with 2025 representing a record year. The financial outcome, however, was far more volatile because realized pricing moved from $7,745 per REO metric ton in 2021 to $11,974 in 2022, then fell to $6,854 in 2023 and $4,414 in 2024 before recovering modestly to $4,707 in 2025. Revenue consequently peaked at $527.5 million in 2022 despite lower physical production than in 2025.





*Exhibit 2 | MP's Physical Output Rose While Rare-earth Pricing Compressed*

REO production reached a record in 2025 even as realized prices remained well below the 2022 peak.

*Left and right axes use different units and scales; the lines are not directly comparable in level.*

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

That divergence is the central reason vertical integration matters. MP's earnings were historically tied to a commodity-like concentrate product whose economics were strongly influenced by global rare-earth pricing and China-centric processing. By 2023, the company had begun producing separated NdPr. Production rose from 200 metric tons in 2023 to 1,294 in 2024 and 2,599 in 2025. Sales increased from only 10 metric tons in 2023 to 1,142 in 2024 and 1,994 in 2025. In 2025, NdPr oxide and metal revenue reached $115.1 million compared with $42.0 million of rare-earth concentrate revenue, a meaningful inversion of the historical revenue mix.





*Exhibit 3 | Stage II Moved from Project Status to Measurable Production*

Separated NdPr production increased more than 12x between 2023 and 2025.

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.





*Exhibit 12 | MP Is Shifting Revenue from Concentrate Toward Separated NdPr and Magnetics*

The strategic question is increasingly whether downstream value capture can offset weaker concentrate economics.
*Not a like-for-like consolidated revenue bridge: Magnetics became a separately visible operating segment only as the downstream business matured.*
*China concentrate sales ceased July 2025.*
Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

Downstream magnetics became financially visible for the first time in 2025. The segment generated $66.9 million of revenue, magnetic precursor sales began in the first quarter, and finished NdFeB magnet manufacturing commenced in December 2025, with commercial deliveries guided to ramp from late 2026. Commercial validation also improved. The General Motors relationship provides evidence that the platform can qualify into demanding electric-motor applications, while the July 2025 Apple agreement is a multiyear commitment of approximately $500 million to purchase magnets made at Fort Worth, reported to include a $200 million prepayment, with shipments slated to begin in 2027 and a recycling line planned at Mountain Pass. These relationships do not prove humanoid demand, but they narrow the gap between Mountain Pass ore and high-performance end-market motors.

The U.S. government partnership further changes the payoff profile. The 2025 agreement supports expansion of Independence to roughly 3,000 metric tons of annual magnet capacity, construction of the second 10X facility, additional heavy-rare-earth processing, and long-term price and offtake support. MP committed up to $600 million of existing cash toward the projects. The price protection agreement, beginning in October 2025 and extending approximately through 2035, should reduce some downside from extreme NdPr price weakness, although it introduces a larger policy and government-contract dependency.

The cost of this strategic repositioning is capital intensity. Capex totaled roughly $1.07 billion over 2021-2025, peaking at $326.6 million in 2022 and $261.9 million in 2023. Operating cash flow fell from $343.5 million in the unusually strong 2022 pricing environment to $62.7 million in 2023, $13.3 million in 2024, and negative $155.8 million in 2025. Some of the 2025 deterioration reflected inventory accumulation and the cessation of China sales, but the broader point is unchanged: vertical integration requires substantial funding before downstream economics fully mature.





*Exhibit 4 | The Downstream Buildout Has Required Substantial Capital Before Mature Cash Returns*

Capex has exceeded operating cash flow in four of the five years shown.
*Cumulative 2021-2025 capex is approximately $1.07bn.*
Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

Within the humanoid framework, MP is best understood as a materials-and-magnet scarcity exposure. The upside case rests on rising demand for high-performance motors across robotics, EVs, defense, and advanced electronics increasing the strategic value of an integrated Western NdPr and magnet platform. The principal risk is financial execution: a slower downstream ramp, weak rare-earth pricing, or poor magnet economics could leave shareholders funding a capital-intensive buildout without sufficient incremental value capture.

## Catalyst and Thesis-Break Framework

The next phase of the MP Materials thesis is defined by value capture. NdPr production increased from 200 MT in FY2023 to 1,294 MT in FY2024 and 2,599 MT in FY2025, while Magnetics generated $66.9 million of revenue in its first meaningful commercial year. The key underwriting question is whether higher-value downstream output can scale quickly enough to reduce dependence on concentrate pricing and earn an adequate return on the capital already committed.

| Catalyst | What needs to happen | Why it matters | Primary evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| **NdPr separation ramp** | Separated NdPr output continues to rise with improving throughput and yields. | Moves MP away from concentrate economics and supplies its magnet platform. | NdPr production, sales volume, realized pricing, throughput commentary |
| **Independence magnet ramp** | Commercial NdFeB output progresses from commissioning to sustained production. | Connects Mountain Pass directly to motors and actuators and raises value capture per unit of ore. | Magnet output, utilization, customer qualification, Magnetics margins |
| **Magnetics revenue scaling** | Magnetics becomes a material share of consolidated revenue from the FY2025 base of $66.9mm. | Shows that downstream optionality is becoming earnings-relevant. | Segment revenue growth, gross profit, customer mix |
| **Customer diversification** | GM and Apple programs scale and new strategic customers are added. | Reduces concentration and validates the downstream platform across end markets. | New supply agreements, prepayments, customer disclosures |

| Catalyst | What needs to happen | Why it matters | Primary evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| **10X / capacity expansion** | Second magnet facility and Independence expansion advance on schedule. | Raises the ceiling on domestic magnet production and future robotics exposure. | Construction milestones, capex, committed capacity, offtake |
| **Robotics demand visibility** | Robotics or physical-AI customers begin appearing in company disclosures. | Converts humanoid exposure from a demand-vector thesis into direct commercial evidence. | Named customers, robotics demand commentary, end-market mix |
| **Price-floor effectiveness** | Government support materially reduces downside volatility in NdPr economics. | Improves cash-flow visibility while downstream assets ramp. | Price-protection income, realized pricing, Materials EBITDA |

**What would strengthen the thesis.** The strongest confirmation would be simultaneous improvement in three areas: continued NdPr volume growth, materially larger Magnetics revenue, and lower consolidated sensitivity to rare-earth spot pricing. The Apple agreement (an approximately $500 million multiyear purchase commitment that is reported to include a $200 million prepayment) and the government-backed plan to expand Independence toward roughly 3,000 MT of annual magnet capacity provide commercial and financing support, but they do not remove execution risk.

### Thesis-Break Conditions

| Thesis-break condition | Why it matters | What would constitute evidence |
|---|---|---|
| **NdPr output stalls materially below design capacity** | Would indicate that Stage II economics are structurally weaker than planned. | Repeated throughput delays, weak yields, or little progress beyond the FY2025 2,599 MT level |
| **Magnet manufacturing suffers persistent delays or qualification failures** | Would block the move into the highest-value portion of the chain. | Delayed commercial volumes, failed customer qualification, poor utilization |
| **Magnetics remains immaterial after heavy capex** | Would suggest vertical integration is consuming capital without sufficient monetization. | Low segment revenue/gross profit despite completed capacity |
| **Customer concentration remains structurally high** | Would leave downstream economics dependent on a small number of strategic counterparties. | No meaningful customer additions beyond existing anchor programs |
| **Government support becomes necessary for baseline viability** | Would weaken the case that the downstream business is independently competitive. | Economics depend persistently on subsidies or support rather than operating performance |
| **Operating cash burn stays high after the buildout matures** | Would signal weak capital efficiency and poor conversion of strategic assets into cash returns. | Sustained negative OCF despite stable production and commissioning completion |
| **Robotics architectures reduce rare-earth intensity** | Would weaken the physical-AI demand vector for NdFeB materials. | Material substitution toward lower-rare-earth or magnet-free motor architectures |

**The hardest break is financial rather than thematic:** failure to convert downstream capital spending into sustainable downstream gross profit. MP deployed roughly $1.07 billion of capex over FY2021-FY2025, while operating cash flow fell from $343.5 million in FY2022 to negative $155.8 million in FY2025. That cash profile is acceptable during construction and commissioning; it becomes a thesis problem if it persists after the downstream assets are expected to be commercially mature.

Source: MP Materials research notes, derived from FY2021-FY2025 company filings. Apple agreement terms per Apple Newsroom (July 2025) and press coverage of the transaction.

# 3 MOOG: PRECISION MOTION, ACTUATION, AND CONTROL

Moog occupies the next layer of the stack: converting electrical power and control signals into precise mechanical movement. The company's portfolio spans motion control, actuation, electromechanical systems, electronics, hydraulics, and high-reliability controls. Its patent portfolio explicitly includes robotics-related technologies. That makes the technological linkage to humanoids credible, particularly in joints, servo control, positional accuracy, and high-load motion systems. What the filings do not show is equally important: there is no disclosed material humanoid revenue, named humanoid OEM program, or humanoid-specific backlog.

The financial profile is therefore very different from an early-stage robotics supplier. Consolidated revenue increased from approximately $2.85 billion in 2021 to $3.86 billion in 2025, a 7.9% CAGR. Segment operating profit rose faster, from roughly $271 million to $450 million, a 13.5% CAGR. Total backlog increased from approximately $4.8 billion in 2021 to around $6.0 billion in 2025. Operating cash flow improved to about $273 million in 2025, while total capex moderated from a 2023 peak of $173 million to roughly $145 million in 2025.





*Exhibit 5 | Moog's Operating Profit Has Compounded Faster than Revenue*

Revenue and segment operating profit indexed to FY2021 = 100; both series are on the same scale.

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

The robotics-relevant Industrial segment has been less dynamic on revenue but more constructive on profitability. Industrial revenue increased from $891.5 million in 2021 to $955.6 million in 2025, or about 1.7% annualized. Industrial Automation revenue was $427.1 million in 2021, $435.1 million in 2022, $485.5 million in 2023, and $443.6 million in 2024 before portfolio divestitures affected the 2025 comparison. The evidence therefore supports a cyclical industrial-automation profile rather than a secular high-growth one.

Margins tell a better story. Industrial operating margin moved from 9.6% in 2021 to 8.0% in 2022 during supply-chain inflation and restructuring, recovered to 10.4% in 2023, softened to around 9.4% reported in 2024, and reached 11.3% in 2025. The 2025 margin improvement occurred despite a 4% decline in Industrial revenue,

reflecting simplification, pricing, and divestitures. In our reading, the combination of simplification, pricing, and divestitures is consistent with a willingness to trade lower-quality revenue for better portfolio economics. That is a Fayd Capital interpretation of the margin and divestiture evidence, not management guidance.





*Exhibit 6 | Industrial Revenue Was Range-bound, But Profitability Improved*

Revenue stayed in a ~$0.9-1.0bn range while operating margin rose from 9.6% to 11.3%.

*FY2025 revenue affected partly by divestitures, primarily within Industrial Automation.*

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

Moog's aerospace and defense base is also relevant to the robotics thesis. U.S. government contracts accounted for 44% of sales in 2021, 42% in 2022, and 38% in 2025, with foreign-government sales adding another 9% in 2025. These businesses force the company to solve demanding problems in reliability, precision, actuation, and systems integration. That engineering base may be valuable if advanced robotics increasingly requires high-performance actuators rather than commodity motors. The same diversification also dilutes the theme: even strong humanoid adoption may take time to become visible at the consolidated level.

Moog therefore offers robotics optionality on top of a funded base business. The company does not require near-term humanoid adoption to sustain revenue or cash flow, and the stock should not be treated as a proxy for humanoid unit volumes. The relevant evidence is whether robotics and electrification become a larger share of Industrial Automation, whether new actuation programs enter backlog, and whether management begins to identify robotics as a distinct growth contributor.

Two FY2026 developments are important context for any valuation view. First, recent Industrial strength is being driven by data-centre cooling pumps (roughly $100 million of FY2026E revenue against about $25 million in FY2025, per management on the fiscal third-quarter FY2026 earnings call of 31 July 2026; the release itself attributes Industrial growth to data center cooling pumps without quantifying the line), which is AI-infrastructure exposure rather than robotics. Second, FY2026 guided adjusted EPS of $11.65 includes roughly $30 million of claims related to previously incurred IEEPA tariffs, which management put at about $0.70 per share. Removing that non-recurring item implies normalized FY2026E EPS of about $10.95. Moog's adjusted EPS already excludes the $35 million of prior-year federal R&D credits and the $8 million legal-entity tax benefit recognized in the third quarter, so no further adjustment is made for them. The guidance also reflects a higher current-year

R&D credit that Moog did not quantify; we do not adjust for it. On that base the stock trades at roughly 35x normalized earnings, against about 33x on guided EPS. Neither point weakens the engineering relevance of the portfolio, but both mean that today's earnings and multiple should not be read as a robotics signal.

## Catalyst and Thesis-Break Framework

Moog requires a different underwriting framework because the base business is already established. Consolidated revenue increased from approximately $2.85 billion in FY2021 to $3.86 billion in FY2025, while segment operating profit increased from roughly $271 million to $450 million. The relevant robotics question is whether advanced automation can become large enough within the existing motion-control portfolio to generate incremental growth above the aerospace and industrial baseline. The critical upgrade would be a transition from capability evidence to commercial evidence.

**Moog Industrial Automation: revenue (USD millions), FY2021-FY2024**





*Exhibit 15 | Moog's Robotics-adjacent Automation Business Has Been Cyclical, Not Structurally High-growth*

Industrial Automation revenue rose through FY2023 before declining in FY2024.

*No FY2025 value is shown: 2025 divestitures were primarily within Industrial Automation, and no comparable standalone FY2025 revenue figure is available in the research notes.*

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

| Catalyst | What needs to happen | Why it matters | Primary evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Industrial automation reacceleration** | Industrial Automation returns to sustained growth after the FY2024 slowdown. | Creates a stronger operating base for robotics-adjacent products. | Industrial Automation revenue, order commentary |
| **Electromechanical mix increases** | More business shifts toward electric actuation and control systems. | Aligns the product mix more directly with advanced robotics and humanoid architectures. | Product mix, new electrification programs, R&D commentary |
| **Named robotics programs emerge** | Moog begins disclosing robotics OEM, platform, or major automation wins. | Turns technology relevance into direct commercial proof. | Customer wins, program awards, backlog disclosures |
| **Actuation content rises** | Moog captures more value per robotic platform through integrated motion/control content. | Improves economics even if unit volumes remain modest. | Systems content, actuator revenue, platform-level wins |

| Catalyst | What needs to happen | Why it matters | Primary evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Industrial margin expands further** | Higher-value products and portfolio simplification support profitability above the 11.3% FY2025 level. | Demonstrates quality of growth rather than low-margin volume chasing. | Industrial operating margin, pricing, mix |
| **Technology transfer from aerospace/defense** | High-reliability actuation capabilities migrate into advanced industrial robotics. | Allows Moog to monetize an engineering base developed in demanding mission-critical applications. | New electromechanical products, cross-market applications, customer wins |

**What would strengthen the thesis.** The clearest upgrade would be disclosed robotics programs, actuator wins, or sustained automation growth that management can tie directly to advanced robotics. Moog already has the relevant technology base, a roughly $6.0 billion backlog, and approximately $273 million of FY2025 operating cash flow. That gives the company time to wait for the market without depending on a near-term humanoid adoption curve.

**Moog: total backlog (USD billions), selected years: FY2021, FY2022 and FY2025**





*Exhibit 16 | Moog Enters the Robotics Optionality Debate with an Existing Multi-billion-dollar Backlog*

Backlog grew from $4.8bn to ~$6.0bn between FY2021 and FY2025; robotics is upside layered onto aerospace, defense and industrial demand.

*Selected-year series: FY2023 and FY2024 are intentionally not shown; they are outside the research-note dataset and are not estimated.*

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

## Thesis-Break Conditions

| Thesis-break condition | Why it matters | What would constitute evidence |
|---|---|---|
| **Robotics commercialization fails to emerge** | Would imply the technology overlap is real but economically unimportant. | No meaningful robotics program wins despite broad industry growth |
| **Industrial Automation remains structurally stagnant** | Reduces the probability that advanced robotics becomes material within Industrial. | Multi-year lack of organic growth or declining orders |
| **Commodity actuators capture most volumes** | Would limit Moog's ability to monetize premium precision and reliability. | Pricing pressure and market share concentrated in lower-cost components |

| Thesis-break condition | Why it matters | What would constitute evidence |
|---|---|---|
| **Robotics OEMs vertically integrate actuation** | Would reduce the external addressable market for Moog components. | Major platforms internalize motors, joints, drives, and controls |
| **Industrial margin improvement reverses** | Would weaken the quality-of-growth argument that supports the optionality case. | Sustained decline from the FY2025 11.3% margin level |
| **Aerospace and defense remain the only material growth engines** | Would leave humanoid exposure immaterial at the consolidated level. | Incremental earnings continue to come almost entirely from non-robotics businesses |

**The key distinction is that Moog's humanoid thesis can fail without the company thesis failing.** That makes the exposure less pure, but also more durable. Investors are underwriting a profitable engineering platform first and receiving robotics optionality second. The relevant test is whether that optionality begins to move orders, mix, and margins rather than simply remaining technically plausible.

Source: Moog research notes, derived from FY2021-FY2025 company filings. FY2026 figures per Moog's fiscal third-quarter FY2026 release and call summaries (31 July 2026); normalization is a Fayd Capital estimate.

## 4 SYMBOTIC: COMMERCIAL PHYSICAL AI AT WAREHOUSE SCALE

Symbotic provides the closest observable analogue to the commercial physical-AI thesis. Its system already combines autonomous mobile robots, robotic depalletizing and palletizing, machine vision, sensors, dynamic routing, and AI-enabled orchestration software. The company automates pallet, case, and increasingly item-level workflows in large warehouses. That makes Symbotic useful less as a humanoid proxy and more as evidence that autonomous robotic labor can create a viable business when the environment and workflow are sufficiently structured.

Commercial scaling has been rapid. Revenue increased from $251.9 million in 2021 to $593.3 million in 2022, $1.18 billion in 2023, $1.79 billion in 2024, and $2.25 billion in 2025. That is a roughly 73% four-year CAGR. Systems in deployment increased from five to 17, 35, 44, and 50 over the same period. Gross profit rose from $10.4 million to $422.6 million, while gross margin expanded from roughly 4% to 19%. The business remains loss-making on a GAAP basis, but operating-loss margin improved sharply, and adjusted EBITDA moved from negative $17.6 million in 2023 to positive $61.7 million in 2024 and $147.5 million in 2025.





*Exhibit 7 | Commercial Robotic Deployment Scaled Tenfold in Four Years*

Revenue rose ~8.9x and systems in deployment rose 10x between FY2021 and FY2025.

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.





*Exhibit 8 | Symbotic's Unit Economics Improved as the Platform Scaled*

Gross margin dipped in FY2024 before recovering to ~19% in FY2025; adjusted EBITDA turned positive after FY2023.

*Adjusted EBITDA for FY2021-FY2022 is not included in the research-note dataset and is not estimated. Gross margins are approximate.*

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

The revenue mix remains hardware- and deployment-heavy. Systems revenue accounted for approximately 94% of 2025 revenue, at $2.12 billion. Software maintenance and support generated $29.6 million and operating services $98.5 million. Those smaller streams are growing quickly: software maintenance and support revenue increased 109% in 2025, while operation services increased 44%. Forty-eight operational systems were under software maintenance and support contracts in 2025, compared with 25 in 2024. Software

maintenance and support is the more clearly recurring stream, and its growth points toward a larger recurring layer as the installed base matures. Operation services are better described as post-deployment service revenue unless the contract structure supports calling them recurring.





*Exhibit 18 | Symbotic's Post-deployment Revenue Layer Is Beginning to Scale*

The combined service layer rose from $24.3mm in FY2021 to $128.1mm in FY2025.

*'Service layer' combines software maintenance & support and operation services; it is not labeled as recurring revenue because operation services may not be fully recurring.*

*Systems installations still account for ~94% of FY2025 revenue.*

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

Symbotic's technology profile maps directly onto several physical-AI requirements. Its robots can travel at up to 25 mph, operate autonomously, coordinate as a fleet, respond dynamically to anomalies, and work with robotic arms and vision systems inside an integrated workflow. R&D spending rose from $73.4 million in 2021 to $216.0 million in 2025. R&D intensity fell from roughly 29% of revenue to 10% over that period, evidence of operating leverage rather than reduced absolute investment. The disclosed patent portfolio also increased from more than 700 issued or pending patents in 2024 to roughly 1,100 in 2025.

The strategic broadening beyond case-level warehouses is especially relevant. The 2025 acquisition of Walmart's Advanced Systems and Robotics business adds micro-fulfillment and item-level handling. Walmart committed to 400 systems subject to performance metrics, with an option for 200 more, while disclosed development funding totaled roughly $520 million. Item-level manipulation is materially closer to the heterogeneous handling problem that general-purpose robots must solve than moving standardized pallets and cases.

The major weakness is concentration. Walmart represented approximately 94% of revenue in 2022, 88% in 2023, and 85% in 2025. Backlog rose from $11.1 billion in 2022 to $23.3 billion in 2023 after the GreenBox agreement and remained around $22.4 billion to $22.5 billion in 2024-2025, but Walmart and GreenBox account for the vast majority. The backlog provides long-duration visibility; it does not eliminate customer, implementation, or financing risk.

**Symbotic: backlog (USD billions, Panel A) and Walmart share of revenue (%, Panel B), FY2022-FY2025**





*Exhibit 9 | Backlog Visibility Is Large, But Concentrated in Very Few Customers*

Walmart's share of revenue has declined gradually but remains at roughly 85%.

*Walmart share for FY2024 is not included in the research-note dataset and is not estimated. 'All other customers' is the residual (100% less Walmart share).*

*The FY2023 backlog increase largely reflects the GreenBox agreement.*

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

For the humanoid thesis, Symbotic's role is to demonstrate the commercial end state. The company shows that robotic labor can scale when tasks are repetitive, facilities can be redesigned around automation, utilization is high, and customer economics are measurable. It also shows why the humanoid problem is harder. Symbotic controls the environment. General-purpose humanoids must deal with a wider distribution of objects, spaces, human interactions, and edge cases. The company is therefore a benchmark for what physical AI can look like when the problem is constrained enough to monetize today.

## Catalyst and Thesis-Break Framework

Symbotic is already beyond the proof-of-concept stage. Revenue increased from $251.9 million in FY2021 to $2.25 billion in FY2025, systems in deployment rose from 5 to 50, and adjusted EBITDA improved from approximately negative $17.6 million in FY2023 to positive $147.5 million in FY2025. The next question is whether the installed base can support durable margins, post-deployment service economics, broader customers, and increasingly general robotic capability.

**Symbotic: adjusted EBITDA margin (% of revenue), FY2023-FY2025**





*Exhibit 19 | Operating Leverage Became Visible as Deployment Scale Matured*

Adjusted EBITDA margin moved from -1.5% to 6.6% in two years.

*FY2021-FY2022 adjusted EBITDA is not included in the research-note dataset and is not backfilled.*

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

| Catalyst | What needs to happen | Why it matters | Primary evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Deployment growth** | Backlog continues converting into operational systems. | Transforms contracted demand into revenue, installed base, and future service revenue. | Systems in deployment, project starts/completions |
| **Gross-margin durability** | FY2025 gross margin near 19% proves sustainable or improves. | Shows that deployment economics mature with scale rather than deteriorate. | Systems gross margin, total gross margin, cost control |
| **Adjusted EBITDA scaling** | EBITDA grows materially faster than revenue. | Confirms operating leverage in a capital- and implementation-intensive model. | Adjusted EBITDA and margin |
| **Service-layer growth** | Software maintenance/support (the more clearly recurring stream) and operation services become more material. | Improves revenue quality and lifetime value of the installed base. | Software/support revenue, attached service contracts |
| **Customer diversification** | Walmart share falls while overall growth remains healthy. | Demonstrates that the platform generalizes beyond one anchor customer. | Walmart % of revenue, new customer contribution |
| **GreenBox conversion** | The large GreenBox commitment translates into actual deployments. | Validates Warehouse-as-a-Service as a second demand channel. | GreenBox revenue, site starts, system deployment |
| **Micro-fulfillment execution** | The 400-system Walmart opportunity advances through performance milestones. | Moves Symbotic toward item-level handling and more heterogeneous robotic tasks. | ASR milestones, micro-fulfillment deployment, acceptance tests |
| **Robotics platform expansion** | ASR and OhmniLabs capabilities produce new form factors or applications. | Broadens Symbotic beyond the original case-level warehouse architecture. | New product launches, acquisitions, customer use cases |

| Catalyst | What needs to happen | Why it matters | Primary evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Software leverage** | Throughput improves without proportional growth in hardware cost or robot count. | Raises returns on installed systems and supports a more software-like margin profile. | Throughput metrics, robot density, gross margin |

**The most strategically interesting catalyst is the move from cases toward items.** The 2025 Walmart micro-fulfillment agreement covers 400 systems, with an option for another 200, and approximately $520 million of disclosed development funding. Item-level handling increases object diversity and manipulation complexity, pushing the platform incrementally closer to the problem set that general-purpose robotic labor must solve.





*Exhibit 21 | ASR Moves Symbotic from Case-level Automation Toward Item-level Handling*

The Walmart micro-fulfillment program increases object diversity and manipulation complexity; it is not humanoid development.

*The 400-system commitment is subject to defined performance metrics; the additional 200 systems are an option, not a committed purchase.*

Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

Customer diversification is the second major proof point. Walmart accounted for approximately 94% of revenue in FY2022, 88% in FY2023, and 85% in FY2025. That direction is favorable, but concentration remains extreme. GreenBox, which committed at least $7.5 billion to Symbotic systems over six years and drove a large share of the FY2023 backlog increase, becomes especially important as evidence that the economics extend beyond a single anchor customer.





*Exhibit 20 | Walmart Concentration Is Declining, But Remains the Central Underwriting Risk*

Walmart's share fell from 94% to 85% over FY2022-FY2025; other large customers represented ~13% of FY2025 revenue.
*FY2024 share is not included in the research-note dataset and is not interpolated or estimated.*
Source: Company filings; Fayd Capital analysis.

## Thesis-Break Conditions

| Thesis-break condition | Why it matters | What would constitute evidence |
|---|---|---|
| **Backlog does not convert** | Would undermine the value of the reported demand pipeline. | Persistent slippage between backlog, deployments, and recognized revenue |
| **Gross margins fall structurally below FY2025 levels** | Could indicate that system economics do not improve with scale. | Sustained margin compression despite more deployments |
| **Adjusted EBITDA stops scaling** | Would weaken the operating-leverage thesis. | Revenue growth without corresponding EBITDA growth |
| **Walmart concentration remains near current levels indefinitely** | Would limit evidence that Symbotic is a broadly adoptable platform. | Little customer diversification despite broader sales efforts |
| **GreenBox rollout underperforms** | Would weaken the second major demand pillar and backlog quality. | Material deployment delays or reduced commitments |
| **Micro-fulfillment misses performance thresholds** | Would limit expansion into item-level automation. | Failed acceptance milestones or reduced system commitments |
| **Operation services remain structurally loss-making** | Could impair lifetime economics of a larger installed base. | Persistent negative service gross profit |
| **New AI-first robotics architectures outperform Symbotic** | Creates technological obsolescence risk. | Competitors achieve comparable throughput with lower infrastructure cost |
| **Flexible general-purpose robots displace fixed automation** | Could change the optimal warehouse architecture. | Customers prefer adaptable robots over highly engineered fixed systems |

**Humanoids are therefore both a catalyst and a competitive risk for Symbotic.** If general-purpose robots become reliable and inexpensive enough, they could expand the total automation market while also challenging fixed infrastructure. Symbotic's defense is that commercial robotics is a systems problem: reliability,

orchestration, throughput, maintenance, and workflow integration matter alongside intelligence. The thesis strengthens if the company can keep broadening task capability while preserving those operating advantages.

Source: Symbotic research notes, derived from FY2021-FY2025 operating history and company filings.

## 5 HOW THE THREE EXPOSURES FIT TOGETHER

The three exposures are complementary rather than interchangeable. Each captures a different stage of value creation and a different failure mode. MP Materials depends on whether demand for high-performance motors creates enough scarcity and downstream value to justify a domestic rare-earth and magnet chain. Moog depends on whether advanced robots require higher-value actuation and control content that incumbent precision-motion specialists can supply. Symbotic depends on whether autonomous robotic systems can scale with improving unit economics and manageable customer concentration.

This also creates different timing characteristics. MP can benefit from broader electrification and strategic rare-earth demand before humanoids reach mass production. Moog can benefit from aerospace, defense, industrial automation, and electrified machinery while retaining robotics optionality. Symbotic already monetizes physical automation, but its nearer-term results depend on deployment execution rather than a future humanoid cycle. In that sense, the stack moves from scarce inputs, to mechanical capability, to proven robotic labor economics.

The quantitative profiles reinforce those distinctions. For MP, the critical five-year signal is the move from more than 42,000 metric tons of concentrate production toward 2,599 metric tons of separated NdPr and a newly commercial Magnetics segment. For Moog, segment operating profit compounded faster than revenue while Industrial margin improved to 11.3%. For Symbotic, the defining evidence is commercialization at scale: revenue approaching $2.25 billion, 50 systems in deployment, a 19% gross margin, and positive adjusted EBITDA.

A layered framework also reduces dependence on a single humanoid-adoption forecast. MP and Moog retain meaningful demand drivers from electrification, defense, and industrial automation if humanoid volumes disappoint. Symbotic can continue monetizing automation in structured environments if general-purpose humanoids take longer to penetrate unstructured settings. The trade-off is lower thematic purity: a successful humanoid cycle could generate greater percentage upside in a pure-play OEM or specialized supplier than in these broader businesses.

The principal risks are therefore distinct. MP faces commodity-price, capital-intensity, downstream-ramp, and policy risks. Moog faces thematic dilution, industrial cyclicality, fixed-price program risk, and uncertainty over whether its capabilities translate into meaningful robotics content. Symbotic faces customer concentration, deployment risk, margin volatility, and the possibility that warehouse-specific architectures do not generalize to broader physical AI. The thesis should be monitored through operating evidence rather than narrative momentum.

## 6 CROSS-COMPANY CATALYST AND THESIS-BREAK DASHBOARD

The monitoring framework follows directly from each company's position in the stack. MP Materials must convert upstream scarcity into downstream magnet economics. Moog must convert a technically relevant motion-control portfolio into financially relevant robotics exposure. Symbotic must extend commercial robotic automation across customers and tasks while preserving durable margins.

The catalyst sequence is therefore distinct. For MP, the hierarchy is NdPr throughput, magnet production, Magnetics revenue, and customer diversification. For Moog, it is Industrial Automation growth, electromechanical mix, named robotics wins, and sustained margin quality. For Symbotic, it is backlog conversion, deployment growth, gross-margin durability, service-layer revenue, customer diversification, and expansion from cases into item-level handling.

The break conditions are equally distinct. MP fails if downstream assets do not generate adequate returns on invested capital. Moog fails thematically if robotics remains commercially immaterial as the industry scales. Symbotic fails if backlog does not convert, margins fail to improve with scale, or the platform cannot diversify beyond anchor customers. The framework therefore diversifies the assumptions being underwritten, even though it does not eliminate risk.

| Company | Exposure layer | Primary catalyst | Key KPI | Principal thesis break |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **MP Materials** | Materials / magnets | Downstream integration reaches commercial scale | NdPr output; Magnetics revenue; OCF | Magnetics fails to earn adequate returns on invested capital |
| **Moog** | Actuation / motion control | Robotics becomes a meaningful premium actuation market | Industrial Automation growth; Industrial margin; robotics wins | Robotics remains technologically relevant but financially immaterial |
| **Symbotic** | Systems / physical AI | Automation scales across customers and more complex tasks | Deployments; gross margin; EBITDA; Walmart concentration | Backlog or platform economics fail to generalize beyond anchor customers |

## 7 VALUATION SCENARIOS AND ASSESSMENT

The stack framework identifies where exposure sits; valuation determines whether that exposure is attractive at the current entry point. This section therefore converts the operating thesis into a scenario assessment under three defined outcomes and asks what current prices require. It does not produce price targets. The driver-based scenarios use a 31 December 2027 reference date, roughly 15 months from the 30 September 2026 pricing date and within the stated 12-18 month catalyst window, with weights of 25% bear, 50% base, and 25% bull. The probabilities are judgmental inputs, and no full DCF or integrated three-statement model underlies the outputs.

### Market Context at 30 September 2026

| Metric | MP Materials | Moog (MOG.A) | Symbotic |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Share price** | $47.55 | $381.47 | $42.07 |
| **Market capitalization** | $9.35bn (fully diluted) | $12.08bn | $25.44bn (economic shares) |
| **Enterprise value** | $8.84bn | $13.16bn | $23.74bn |
| **Street average price target** | $74.29 | $446.40 | $62.86 |
| **Valuation basis in model** | CY2029E EBITDA x EV/EBITDA | FY2028E normalized EPS x P/E | FY2028E adj. EBITDA x EV/EBITDA |

Source: StockAnalysis (market data, consensus, 30 Sep 2026); company releases; Fayd Capital analysis. Symbotic market capitalization uses the ~605mm economic share count (Class A plus V-1 and V-3 units), not Class A alone. MP fully diluted share count includes the DoD preferred on an as-converted basis and net warrant shares.

## Scenario Framework

Each scenario varies the operating drivers that matter most to that business and applies a multiple appropriate to its stage. MP is built on a CY2029E run-rate EBITDA, the first year in which the 10X magnet facility is assumed to operate, with the Department of Defense price floor, profit-sharing and EBITDA floor, the $400 million preferred (7% PIK, $30.03 conversion) and 11.2 million warrants all modelled explicitly. Moog is built on FY2028E normalized EPS, with robotics shown as a separate and explicit option. Symbotic is built on FY2028E revenue, adjusted EBITDA margin and EV/EBITDA, plus net cash, on the full economic share count.

| Company | Driver | Bear | Base | Bull |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **MP** | NdPr sales volume (MT) | 4,500 | 6,000 | 7,500 |
| **MP** | NdPr market price ($/kg) | $75 | $110 | $140 |
| **MP** | All-in cash cost ($/kg) | $72 | $62 | $55 |
| **MP** | 10X output in first full year (MT) | 1,000 | 3,000 | 6,000 |
| **MP** | CY2029E adjusted EBITDA | $272mm | $436mm | $783mm |
| **MP** | EV / EBITDA | 12x | 16x | 20x |
| **Moog** | FY2028E EPS (incl. robotics option) | $11.62 | $13.74 | $15.36 |
| **Moog** | Robotics revenue, FY2028E | - | - | $100mm |
| **Moog** | P/E | 22x | 28x | 31x |
| **Symbotic** | FY2028E revenue | $3.39bn | $4.03bn | $4.55bn |
| **Symbotic** | FY2028E adjusted EBITDA margin | 10.5% | 15.0% | 18.0% |
| **Symbotic** | EV / EBITDA | 24x | 38x | 48x |

Source: Fayd Capital scenario model. Bear/base/bull drivers are analyst judgments. Moog EPS growth is applied to normalized FY2026E EPS of ~$10.95. The DoD price floor limits MP's price risk but caps its share of upside: DoD takes 30% of NdPr price above $110/kg, and 10X EBITDA above its floor is shared.

## Scenario Ranges

The ranges below are outputs of the stated drivers, not targets. MP has the widest range because operating leverage, the fixed preferred claim, and the 10X ramp create substantial scenario dispersion. Moog's range is narrower, and the current price sits slightly above the middle of it. Symbotic falls between the two: its current price is close to the center of the range, while outcomes remain highly sensitive to margin and multiple assumptions.

| Metric | MP Materials | Moog (MOG.A) | Symbotic |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Bear / base / bull scenario value** | $13.53 / $34.48 / $77.60 | $255.57 / $384.60 / $476.10 | $16.19 / $40.21 / $66.96 |
| **Return vs current price (bear / base / bull)** | -72% / -28% / +63% | -33% / +1% / +25% | -62% / -4% / +59% |
| **Probability-weighted scenario value** | $40.02 | $375.22 | $40.89 |
| **Probability-weighted return** | -15.8% | -1.6% | -2.8% |
| **Skew (bull upside / bear downside)** | 0.88 | 0.75 | 0.96 |
| **Current price position in bear-to-bull range** | 53% | 57% | 51% |

| Metric | MP Materials | Moog (MOG.A) | Symbotic |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Probability-weighted value vs Street target** | -46% | -16% | -35% |

Source: Fayd Capital scenario model; StockAnalysis (Street targets). Scenario values are not price targets. The gap to Street targets shows that these assumptions are materially more conservative than the sell side.

### What Current Prices Require

The reverse-engineered operating requirements provide the clearest bridge from theme to valuation. At the base-case multiple, MP's current price requires roughly $603 million of CY2029E EBITDA, about 38% above the $436 million base case. Moog requires approximately $13.62 of FY2028E EPS at 28x, slightly below the $13.74 base case. Symbotic requires roughly $635 million of FY2028E EBITDA at 38x, only modestly above the $605 million base case. This is why Moog and Symbotic screen closest to balanced in the current framework.

| | MP Materials | Moog (MOG.A) | Symbotic |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Metric required at today's price (base multiple)** | CY2029E EBITDA ~$603mm at 16x | FY2028E EPS ~$13.62 at 28x | FY2028E EBITDA ~$635mm at 38x |
| **Base-case metric in model** | $436mm | $13.74 | $605mm |
| **Bull-case metric in model** | $783mm | $15.36 | $819mm |
| **Current multiple on base-case metric** | 20.3x EV/EBITDA | 27.8x P/E (34.8x on normalized FY2026E) | 39.3x EV/EBITDA |

Source: Fayd Capital scenario model. Required metric solves the scenario valuation for today's share price at the base-case multiple.

### 12-18 Month Catalyst Path

The scenario ranges should move only as operating evidence changes the underlying drivers. The table below links the principal 12-18 month catalysts to the assumptions they would most directly affect.

| Company | Next two to three quarters | 2027 | Scenario driver affected |
|---|---|---|---|
| **MP Materials** | NdPr output sustained above ~1,000 MT per quarter; Independence commercial deliveries from Q4 2026; heavy rare-earth (Dy/Tb) output from late 2026 | Apple magnet shipments slated to begin; Independence ramp toward ~3,000 MT; 10X construction toward 2028 commissioning | NdPr volume and unit cost; Independence EBITDA per kg; 10X ramp and DoD floor mechanics |
| **Moog** | FY2026 results and FY2027 guidance (EPS growth off a normalized base); Industrial growth ex data-centre cooling | Backlog conversion; any named robotics or advanced-automation program | Normalized EPS growth; P/E; robotics option value |
| **Symbotic** | Fiscal Q4 FY2026 results (guided $760-780mm revenue, $100-105mm adjusted EBITDA); FCF delivery | Backlog conversion; GreenBox deployments; Walmart micro-fulfillment milestones (back-of-store revenue not material before early 2028) | Revenue growth; EBITDA margin; EV/EBITDA; net cash |

Source: Company releases and call summaries as of 30 September 2026; Fayd Capital analysis. Timing is as guided by management and may change.

### Scenario Assessment

For analytical consistency, the framework applies two screening thresholds: an annualized probability-weighted return above 12% and modeled upside/downside skew of at least 1.5x. None of the three companies satisfies both thresholds under the current assumptions, and each produces a negative probability-weighted return.

These thresholds are analytical parameters used to compare valuation asymmetry across the companies and should not be interpreted as portfolio-allocation or investment recommendations.

**MP Materials: unfavorable modeled asymmetry, widest dispersion.** The thematic case remains intact, but the current price requires approximately $600 million of EBITDA versus a $436 million base case, while the government-contracted share of base-case EBITDA is roughly one-third. The DoD floor supports downside economics but also limits participation in higher NdPr pricing. The modeled asymmetry would improve with sustained NdPr volume, unit cost trending toward the base-case $62/kg, Independence shipments ramping on schedule, and continued 10X progress.

**Moog: current valuation near modeled base case.** The current price of $381.47 sits near the $384.60 base-case value, so the valuation neither embeds a stretched outcome nor offers a margin of safety. At about 35x normalized earnings, the price requires roughly $13.62 of FY2028E EPS at 28x, in line with the $13.74 base case. Skew is the weaker point: bull upside is about three-quarters of bear downside (0.75), and the probability-weighted return is roughly -2%. The modeled robotics option contributes about $11 per share even in the bull case, or roughly 2% of value, and therefore does not materially alter the scenario assessment. The modeled asymmetry would improve with named robotics programs, stronger Industrial growth excluding data-centre cooling, or normalized EPS growth above the 12% base assumption, and it would weaken if the multiple de-rates toward the 22x bear case.

**Symbotic: near-balanced modeled risk/reward.** Symbotic has the strongest skew of the three at 0.96, and the current price sits near the midpoint of the modeled range. The outcome is most sensitive to FY2028E EBITDA margin and the multiple applied to that margin. Base-case FY2027E and FY2028E revenue represents about one-third of the $22.5 billion backlog, which supports the plausibility of conversion, while Walmart concentration at about 85% of revenue remains the dominant company-specific risk. The modeled asymmetry would improve with a margin trajectory above the roughly 13% run-rate toward 15%, lower Walmart concentration, and visible GreenBox conversion.

### Relative Risk Ranking

Portfolio-weighting analysis is outside the scope of this report because measured volatility and correlation inputs are not yet included. The table therefore uses two narrower indicators, five-year beta and scenario dispersion, and identifies the principal risk that each measure does not capture.

| | MP Materials | Moog (MOG.A) | Symbotic |
|---|---|---|---|
| **5-year beta** | 1.95 | 0.97 | 1.94 |
| **Scenario dispersion ((bull - bear) / price)** | 135% | 58% | 121% |
| **Rank by scenario dispersion (1 = widest)** | 1 | 3 | 2 |
| **Main risk not captured by beta** | DoD contract terms; 10X execution; capital intensity | De-rating from ~35x normalized EPS; one-off earnings items | Walmart concentration (~85% of revenue); backlog conversion |

Source: StockAnalysis (beta); Fayd Capital scenario model. Beta captures only market-driven risk, and Moog's 5-year beta predates its recent re-rating. Scenario dispersion measures how wide this model's scenarios are, not realized volatility.

### Limitations and Basis of Preparation

The scenario outputs depend on several judgmental assumptions that should be tested as new evidence arrives: Moog's exit P/E, MP's unit cost, 10X ramp and EV/EBITDA, and Symbotic's margin and valuation multiple. Consensus FY2027 and FY2028 estimates were not available, so the scenarios are not anchored to Street operating forecasts beyond FY2026 or to consensus price targets. The probability-weighted values sit 16% to 46% below those targets, indicating that this framework uses materially more conservative assumptions than current sell-side target values. Market data are drawn from third-party aggregators and company releases as of 30 September 2026 and should be confirmed against primary filings before being relied upon. No discounted cash flow or integrated three-statement model has been built for any of the three companies, and volatility and correlation inputs are excluded pending measured price history. The section is designed as a transparent scenario-analysis framework for research and educational purposes rather than as a comprehensive valuation model or investment recommendation.

## 8 CONCLUSION

The public-market route into humanoid robotics is currently most coherent as a stack of enabling exposures. MP Materials, Moog, and Symbotic represent three economic layers that must function if physical AI is to scale: critical motor materials, precise mechanical actuation, and commercially viable robotic labor.

MP Materials provides the earliest-stage exposure through the security and vertical integration of critical magnet inputs. Moog occupies the mechanical layer, converting power and software commands into reliable motion. Symbotic sits furthest downstream, where the underwriting question is whether autonomous systems can deliver enough productivity to support large-scale deployment. The three companies therefore express different stages of one physical-AI value chain.

The operating evidence is strongest where commercialization is already visible. Symbotic has scaled revenue nearly ninefold since 2021 and reached positive adjusted EBITDA. Moog has compounded operating profit faster than revenue while improving Industrial profitability. MP has increased physical production and moved separated NdPr and magnet manufacturing from project status into reported operating metrics. None provides clean current humanoid revenue exposure; together they provide diversified exposure to the enabling economics of physical AI while the humanoid market remains early.

The scenario assessment is intentionally narrower than the thematic conclusion. A layered stack can remain a sound framework for analyzing the physical-AI thesis while individual entry valuations remain demanding. Under the current prices and scenario assumptions disclosed in this report, none of the three companies meets the framework's predefined return and asymmetry thresholds. Moog and Symbotic screen closest to balanced, while MP Materials carries the widest scenario dispersion and the largest gap between its current price and modeled base-case value. The analytical assessment should evolve as new operating evidence changes the modeled drivers or as market prices materially alter the implied scenario returns.

# APPENDIX: QUANTITATIVE REFERENCE

## MP Materials

| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **REO production (MT)** | 42,413 | 42,499 | 41,557 | 45,455 | 50,692 |
| **Realized price / REO MT** | $7,745 | $11,974 | $6,854 | $4,414 | $4,707 |
| **NdPr production (MT)** | - | - | 200 | 1,294 | 2,599 |
| **Operating cash flow ($mm)** | 102.0 | 343.5 | 62.7 | 13.3 | (155.8) |
| **Capex ($mm)** | 123.9 | 326.6 | 261.9 | 186.4 | 172.4 |

## Moog

| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Consolidated revenue ($mm)** | 2,852 | 3,036 | 3,319 | 3,609 | 3,861 |
| **Segment operating profit ($mm)** | 271 | 283 | 343 | 404 | 450 |
| **Industrial revenue ($mm)** | 892 | 907 | 983 | 991 | 956 |
| **Industrial operating margin** | 9.6% | 8.0% | 10.4% | 9.4% | 11.3% |
| **Capex ($mm)** | 129 | 139 | 173 | 152 | 145 |

Note: Moog FY2021-FY2023 figures are as reported in the Forms 10-K for FY2023 and FY2024. FY2024-FY2025 figures are as presented in Moog's fourth-quarter FY2025 earnings release, which reflects later re-presentation (as originally reported in the FY2024 10-K, FY2024 segment operating profit was $395 million, Industrial operating margin 9.1% and capex $156 million).

## Symbotic

| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Revenue ($mm)** | 251.9 | 593.3 | 1,176.9 | 1,788.2 | 2,246.9 |
| **Gross profit ($mm)** | 10.4 | 99.6 | 189.7 | 245.7 | 422.6 |
| **Gross margin** | ~4% | ~17% | ~16% | ~14% | ~19% |
| **R&D ($mm)** | 73.4 | 124.1 | 195.0 | 173.5 | 216.0 |
| **Systems in deployment** | 5 | 17 | 35 | 44 | 50 |

## DISCLOSURES AND IMPORTANT INFORMATION

**Basis of preparation.** This report reflects the analysis and opinions of the author, Oleg Godun, as of 30 September 2026, the pricing and data date used throughout. It is Part II of the Fayd Robotics Series and constitutes independent industry research on public-market exposure to the humanoid and physical-AI stack through MP Materials, Moog, and Symbotic.

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**Sources and data.** Company financial and operating data for FY2021 to FY2025, and for FY2026 where noted, are drawn from company filings, earnings releases, and call summaries. Share prices, market capitalizations, enterprise values, Street price targets, consensus figures, and five-year betas are taken from StockAnalysis as of 30 September 2026. These are third-party aggregator data and should be confirmed against primary filings before being relied upon. The terms of the July 2025 Apple agreement are per Apple Newsroom and press coverage, and items described as reported, including the $200 million prepayment, have not been independently confirmed in company filings. All figures are point-in-time.

**Presentation and normalization.** Moog FY2024 and FY2025 figures follow the later re-presentation in its fourth-quarter FY2025 earnings release and differ from those originally reported in the FY2024 Form 10-K, as noted in the Appendix. Moog's normalized FY2026E EPS of approximately $10.95 removes the roughly $0.70 per share of IEEPA tariff claims and is a Fayd Capital estimate, not management guidance. No adjustment is made for the higher current-year R&D credit that Moog did not quantify. Data-centre cooling pump figures reflect management commentary on the 31 July 2026 call and are not quantified in the release.

**Scenario analysis.** The bear, base, and bull values in Section 7 are driver-based outputs referenced to 31 December 2027 and weighted 25%, 50%, and 25%. The drivers and probabilities are analyst judgments. The values are not price targets or forecasts. They are not derived from a discounted cash flow or integrated three-statement model, they are not anchored to consensus FY2027 and FY2028 estimates (none were available), and they exclude volatility and correlation inputs. The probability-weighted values sit 16% to 46% below current Street targets, reflecting materially more conservative assumptions. The MP Materials scenarios depend on modeled Department of Defense terms, including the price floor, profit sharing, the $400 million preferred, and 11.2 million warrants.

## DISCLOSURES AND IMPORTANT INFORMATION (CONTINUED)

**Interpretation and judgment.** The layered-exposure framework, the reading of Moog's margin and divestiture evidence, the catalyst and thesis-break conditions, and the scenario assessments are Fayd Capital interpretation and not company guidance. None of the three companies discloses material humanoid revenue. References to humanoid relevance describe technology fit and demand linkage, not reported revenue.

**Forward-looking statements.** Statements about catalysts, ramp timing, and future operating outcomes, including the NdPr, Independence, and 10X ramps, Moog's robotics optionality, GreenBox conversion, and Walmart micro-fulfillment, are forward-looking. Timing reflects management guidance and may change. They are subject to commodity pricing, policy and government-contract dependency, customer concentration, execution, and competitive risks described in this report. Actual outcomes may differ materially.

**Independence.** This report does not represent the views of any employer, client, or affiliated institution of the author.